Intuition says that C should shoot A first. Let's go through the game tree and in what situation does C become uncertain.
Let's denote the participants by A, B, and C. Let's write down the probability of C winning at the beginning of the game as P( C, B, A), where the identity of the remaining participants are listed as arguments of the function P( ), and the underlined C indicates that C has the first shot. If there are only two participants left, then we can write out the corresponding win percentages. Note that P( . ) always indicate the probability of C winning.
P( C, B ) = ( 1-pb)pc/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ]
P( C, B ) = pc/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ]
P( C, A ) = pc
P( C, A ) = 0.
Now, we start off the the logic that A will always shoot the remaining person(s) with the highest hit probability. Therefore, B will always shoot the remaining participant with highest hit probability as well.
I drew out two game tree for two cases- one where C chooses to shoot B first and one where C shoots A first. The game trees are here
Combining the game trees above with the two-participant results in the beginning, we can write down the winning chances for C from the two strategies. Let WA be the winning chance for C if he shoots A first, and let WB be the winning chance if he shoot B first, the probabilities are
WB = (1-pc)pc pb/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ] + (1-pc) (1-pb) pc
WA = (1-pc)pc pb/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ] + (1-pc) (1-pb) pc + pc pc (1-pb)/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ]
or
WA = WB + pc pc (1-pb)/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ]
So, we see that shooting A first increases the winning probability by the amount pc pc (1-pb)/[ 1 - (1 - pc)(1-pb) ]. Now, the only way to make C uncertain is to let pc = 0, at which point his winning chance is the same regardless of who he shoots. But if his hitting probability is 0, he's screwed either way.